

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 LUSAKA 01114 01 OF 02 011238Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----076071 011242Z /11

O P 011130Z APR 78  
FM AMEMBASSY LUSAKA  
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AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE  
INFO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY GABORONE PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LILONGWE PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY  
AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 LUSAKA 1114

EXDIS

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

LAGOS FOR PRESIDENTIAL PARTY, AMBASSADOR YOUNG,  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE, AND AMBASSADOR MCHENRY

E. O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PDEV RH US UK  
SUBJ: RHODESIA: ZAMBIA STRENGTHENS ITS COMMITMENT TO HELP  
PUSH NEGOTIATIONS

REF: (A) LUSAKA 1110, (B) LUSAKA 1111

SUMMARY: IN EXCHANGING CARTER-KAUNDA LETTERS CHONA INDICATES  
GREATER WILLINGNESS TO PRESS NKOMO FOR NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY  
THAN HERETOFORE. HE BELIEVES INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS UNDER AAP  
CAN BE RESOLVED INCLUDING THE MATTER OF THE PF'S DEMAND FOR A  
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MAJORITY OF THE GOVERNING COUNCIL "SINCE WE ARE ONLY TALKING  
ABOUT A SIX MONTH PERIOD." HE APPEARS TO HAVE NO PROBLEMS WITH  
OUR APPROACH TO A MALTA II - ALL PARTIES CONFERENCE. WE BELIEVE  
THE RECENT INDICATIONS OF ZAPU'S MILITARY WEAKNESS INCLUDING  
WOUNDING OF ITS COMMANDER MAY HAVE INFLUENCED ZAMBIAN WILLING-  
NESS TO PRESS NKOMO TOWARDS A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. END SUMMARY.

1. PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT MARK CHONA HAD ASKED THAT I DELAY GIVING HIM PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT KAUNDA UNTIL THEY COULD COMPLETE WORK ON A NEW LETTER TO PRESIDENT CARTER BECAUSE THEY DID NOT WANT IT TO APPEAR AS A REPLY TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S. WE EXCHANGED LETTERS LATE FRIDAY NIGHT AND DISCUSSED THEM BRIEFLY ALONG WITH THE NAMIBIAN AND RHODESIAN SITUATIONS (REFTELS).

2. CHONA NODDED AS HE READ PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT KAUNDA AND SEEMED TO ACCEPT THE POINTS MADE IN IT. HE SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN CONSIDERABLE DEBATE IN DAR AS TO WHETHER OR NOT TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE U.S. AND UK ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT. EVEN THOUGH THE COMMUNIQUE DID NOT DO SO, THE FRONTLINE PRESIDENTS WERE VERY CLEAR IN THEIR MINDS THAT IT HAD BEEN THE U.S. EFFORTS WHICH HAD KEPT THE UK FROM A MORE POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THE SALISBURY DEVELOPMENTS.

3. CHONA WANTED TO EMPHASIZE THE CONCESSIONS WHICH HE FELT JOSHUA NKOMO AND THE PF HAD MADE TOWARDS MEETING OUR CONCERNS ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSAL. IN LAW AND ORDER, SECURITY AND DEFENSE THE MOZAMBICANS IN DAR HAD POINTED OUT THAT EVEN THEY, WHO HAD DEFEATED THE PORTUGUESE ARMY, HAD AGREED TO PORTUGUESE RESPONSIBILITY DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ACCEPTED THAT WHEN BRITAIN REASSUMED ITS COLONIAL RESPONSIBILITIES IT WOULD REQUIRE ADEQUATE AUTHORITY. THEY ALSO ACCEPTED THE UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE.  
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4. I NOTED THAT THE PF APPEARED TO BE INSISTING STILL ON A MAJORITY OF THE GOVERNING COUNCIL. CHONA REPLIED THAT THE MALTA FORMULA HAD NOW BEEN SUPERSEDED BY FORMATION OF THE INTERNAL SALISBURY GOVERNMENT. THERE WERE ONLY TWO PARTIES NOW, THE PF AND THE SALISBURY GROUP. I TOOK IT THAT HE WAS IMPLYING EQUAL REPRESENTATION ON THE GOVERNING COUNCIL BETWEEN THE SALISBURY GROUP AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WHICH WOULD INDEED GIVE THE PF A MAJORITY OVER THE OTHERS, SO I DID NOT PRESS FOR FURTHER EXPLANATION OF THIS POINT. INSTEAD I CALLED ATTENTION TO THE PASSAGES IN PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER INSISTING ON THE IMPARTIALITY OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD AND REFUSAL TO ACCEPT ANY ONE GROUP'S PREDOMINANT POSITION. I SAID I SAW NO BASIS FOR COMPROMISE ON THIS POINT. CHONA REPLIED THAT SINCE THE TRANSITION PERIOD WOULD ONLY LAST SIX MONTHS THE PATRIOTIC FRONT OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO ACCEPT ALMOST ANYTHING OF THAT SORT.

5. I ASKED CHONA HIS VIEWS ON CONVENING A NEW ALL PARTIES MEETING, SAYING THAT IT WOULD BE EASIER TO MOVE AHEAD WITH MALTA IF THE ALL PARTIES MEETING HAD ALSO BEEN AGREED TO. HE SAW NO PROBLEM IN THIS. NOTING THE POINT IN PRESIDENT KAUNDA'S LETTER THAT THE ALL PARTIES MEETING WOULD HAVE TO BE BASED

ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSAL, I SAID THAT THOUGH THIS WOULD CERTAINLY BE THE APPROACH OF OUR SIDE, THE SALISBURY PARTICIPANTS MIGHT COME TO IT WITH SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND. AGAIN, CHONA SAW NO PROBLEM AND SEEMED TO IMPLY THAT THIS WOULD ALSO BE THE POSITION OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, THOUGH HE ACKNOWLEDGED MUGABE MIGHT HAVE SOME MINOR PROBLEMS.

6. COMMENT: PRESIDENT KAUNDA'S LETTER IS A CLEAR EFFORT TO TRY TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD. (AN APPARENTLY SIMILAR LETTER HAS BEEN DESPATCHED TO CALLAGHAN.) KAUNDA SPECIFICALLY

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
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O P 011130Z APR 78  
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ACCEPTS PARTIES WHO WERE NOT PRESENT IN GENEVA (I.E., CHIRAU) AS PART OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE EXPLICITLY ACCEPTS THE ALL PARTIES CONFERENCE AND THE UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE. BEYOND THAT WE FIND THE TONE OF THE LETTER ENCOURAGING. INSTEAD OF THE SKEPTICISM EXPRESSED SO OFTEN IN THE PAST THAT OUR PROPOSALS COULD LEAD TO A SETTLEMENT IN RHODESIA, KAUNDA SAYS HE BELIEVES WE ARE CLOSE TO A SETTLEMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND PLEDGES TO WORK TOGETHER TOWARDS FORWARD MOVEMENT OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS.

7. AS FOR THE CONVERSATION WITH CHONA, AS COMMENTED IN REFTTEL

B, I HAVE NEVER BEFORE HEARD HIM SO PREPARED TO ADOPT POSITIONS INDEPENDENT OF THE LIBERATION FORCES (EITHER SWAPO OR ZAPU) OR SPEAK SO FORCEFULLY ABOUT ZAMBIA'S WILLINGNESS TO DEMAND COOPERATION FROM SAM NUJOMA AND JOSHUA NKOMO. THE PRESIDENT (AND HE) HAD REENTERED THE FRAY, HE SAID, AND THEY INTENDED  
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TO ACT ENERGETICALLY AND PLAY AN IMPORTANT PART. HE SAW THE U.S. AND ZAMBIA ACTING CLOSELY TOGETHER TO BRING SETTLEMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

8. KAUNDA'S INCREASINGLY ACTIVE ROLE IN PRESSING NKOMO TOWARDS GREATER NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY MAY BE RELATED TO GROWING EVIDENCE OF ZAPU'S MILITARY PROBLEMS. WHILE ITS TROOPS APPEAR TO BE RELATIVELY EFFECTIVE, LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS HAVE NOT BEEN RESOLVED. FAILURE OF THE ZAPU CAMPS TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST RHODESIAN ATTACKS IN SPITE OF PRIOR WARNING HAVE BEEN FREQUENT. PROBLEMS OF CROSSING THE ZAMBEZI INTO RHODESIA SEEM TO BE GREATER THAN HAD BEEN ANTICIPATED. MOST DEMORALIZING, HOWEVER, WAS THE RECENT ATTACK AND WOUNDING OF ZIPRA COMMANDER MANGEMA WHO IS STILL IN THE LUSAKA HOSPITAL. REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE TRIBAL DIVISIONS WITHIN ZIPRA ARE SERIOUS.

9. THUS WE BELIEVE THE ZAMBIANS AND PERHAPS NKOMO HIMSELF ARE NOW PREPARED TO MAKE A REAL EFFORT TO STOP THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT THROUGH POLITICAL MEANS. CHONA SAYS HE CONSIDERS NEGOTIATION AS PART OF THE WAR EFFORT. THEY APPEAR TO SEE MORE HOPE IN THIS DIRECTION THAN IN MILITARY ACTION, AT LEAST AT THIS MOMENT.

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## Message Attributes

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